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Reading Kant Ecumenically: Prolegomena 
to an Anthropology of Hope in the 
Aftermath of Modernity 
PHILIP J. ROSSI, S.J. 
l. SITUATING KANT 
WHERE TO LOCA TE KANT and his work on the theological "map" of mo-
dernity is a matter of long-standing contention among his readers and 
interpreters. While there has been a tradition of speaking of Kant as "the 
philosopher ofProtestantism"1 that goes back to the end ofthe 19th cen-
tury, Kant's work has also been appropriated-not without controversy-
in service of so-called "transcendental Thomism:' which constituted one 
important stream of the neo-Thomism that set the prevailing style for 
Catholic philosophy and theology for at least a century. Throughout the 
same period, however, Kant was-and continues to be-also the object 
of fierce polemics, conducted from a variety of Christian theological 
perspectives that viewed him among the thinkers who planted the most 
important intellectual roots of the forms oflate modern atheism. 
I should add a cautionary note here: Christian theologians do not 
constitute a unique e adre of those who would loca te Kant ( or Kant's 
1. E.g., Friedrich Paulsen, Kant der Philosph des Protestantismus (Berlin: Reuther & 
Reichard, 1899); Julius Kaftan, Kant, der Philosph des Protestantismus (Berlin: Reuther 
& Reichard, 1904). 
316 
Philip ]. Rossi, S.]. Reading Kant Ecumenically 
heritage) as a key source for sorne important philosophical strategies of 
modern atheism, for the shaping of intellectual cultures of unbelief, or for 
the rise of a "secularity" that marginalizes or privatizes religious belief. For . 
instance, philosophers, historians, and social scientists (among others) 
who subscribe to what Charles Taylor calls the "subtraction story" of the 
rise of modernity, in which scientific knowledge and technological control 
increasingly displace and replace religious faith and practice, would most 
likely consider Kant and Kant's heritage to have provided crucial intel-
lectual ímpetus to such a secularizing trajectory. 2 
More recently, sorne Kant interpreters in the English-speaking world 
have endeavored to position Kant as at least a friendly ally to Christian 
theological perspectives that make robust affirmations of orthodox render-
ings of Trinitarian and Christological doctrines.3 In addition, there have 
been recent efforts, particularly in Germany, to counter the long-standing 
animus with which Catholic philosophers and theologians had most often 
treated Kant in the hope of making his work a locus for constructive en-
gagement with important elements of the Catholic intellectual tradition.4 
These efforts- whether they seek to engage Kant's work as construc-
tive resource for theological inquiry, or they find his work irremediably 
hostile to the central elements from which theological inquiry originates-
must grapple with important historical and interpretive issues posed by 
his texts, as well as by the trajectories ofboth his personal and public life. 
2. In Taylor's alternate account of secularity, put forth in extensive detail in A Secu-
lar Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2007), which is explicitly offered to 
counter such "subtraction stories," Kant's work and its reception also plays a major 
role, but that role is not simply a negative one that pushes religion and faith to the 
sidelines; it also reconfigures in a positive way what is at stake morally and anthropo-
logically when humans take a stance of faith in the face of the transcendent. 
3· E.g., Chris L. Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist, eds., Kant and the New 
Philosophy of Religion, Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington: 
Indiana Univ. Press, 2006); Chris L. Firestone and Nathan Jacobs, In Defense of Kant's 
Religion, Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion (Bloornington: Indiana Univ. 
Press, 2008). 
4. E.g., Norbert Fischer, ed., Kants Metaphysik und Religionsphilosophie, Kant-
Forschungen 15 (Hamburg: Meiner, 2004); Norbert Fischer, ed., Kant und der 
Katholizismus: Stationen einer wechselhaften Geschichte, Forschungen zur europaisch-
en Geistesgeschichte 8 (Freiburg: Herder, 2005); Aloysius Winter, Der andere Kant: 
Zur philosophischen Theologie Immanuel Kants, Europaea memoria: Reihe I, Studien 
11 (Hildesheim and New York: Olms, 2000). Other contemporary Catholic construc-
tive engagement with Kant in Germany can be found in the works of Richard Shaeffler 
and Thomas Propper. For a proposal for a Catholic reading of Kant, see Philip J. Rossi, 
SJ, "Reading Kant from a Catholic Horizon: Ethics and the Anthropology of Grace:· 
1heological Studies 71 (2010) 79-100. 
317 
A Man of the Church 
Dealing with these trajectories might well be called "the quest for the his-
torical Kant:' so it may be useful for me to make it clear at the outset that 
the kind of "mapping" which I am most interested in examining is not 
one that tries to discern in detail the "historical Kant's" personal religious 
commitment with respect to the ecclesial terrain of 18th-century Prussia. 
The most prudent response to the questions about this dimension of his 
views on Christian faith, practice, and theology may be to consider him 
as at least aspiring to exemplify the attitude of what he intriguingly calls, 
in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason, a "catholic protestant:' that 
is, a "human being whose frame of mind ( though this is not that of their 
church) is given to self-expansion:'5 He seems to take such a person to 
exhibit crucial elements of the proper bearing that a critica! use of reason 
would endorse with respect to the concrete forms that Christian belief 
and practice had so far historically developed. This outlook would most 
centrally include an acknowledgement that there is a (moral) universality 
proper to the fundamental religious claim that our reason places upon 
our finite humanity, but that this universality may not be identified in tato 
with the concrete historical form given to such a claim by the particular 
"ecclesial" faith to which one may, in fact, adhere. 
Though Kant's view here is neither fully articulated, nor unprob-
lematic, it does seem, first, to indicate a principie from which Christian 
ecumenical conversation-or even an interreligious conversation-might 
begin and, second, to be congruent in important ways with aspects of 
the "cosmopolitan perspective" so central to Kant's effort to articulate 
principies for a harmonious world arder of peace among nations. Such 
congruence between Kant's outlook upon religion and his outlook upon 
international relations, moreover, should be unsurprising in view of the 
observation he makes in a footnote added to the second edition of Re-
ligion, that differences in language and differences in religion constitute 
the "two mightily effective causes" that stand athwart the efforts that are 
driven by the practica! interest of reason to have us work for the establish-
ment of a harmonious world order.6 
5. Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason, in Immanuel Kant, Religion and 
Rational Theology, trans. and ed. Allen W Wood and George Di Giovanni, The Cam-
bridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) 14; German text: Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 6 Die Religion innerhalb 
der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, Ausgabe der Koniglichen 
PreuBichen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlín: G. Reimer, 1914) 109. 
6. Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason, 15 3; German text: Kants Gesammelte 
Schriften, 6:123. 
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The main claim of this present essay, which will be put forth in sec-
tions 11 and 111, is that Kant's work can function as a useful resource for 
articulating a -theological anthropology of hope to help address sorne of 
the philosophical and theological questions about humanity and its mean-
ing that seem most urgent for a culture in the aftermath of modernity. 
Before doing that, however, let me indicate why I have chosen not to focus 
on placing the "historical Kant" in direct conversation with these ques-
tions. A key reason for this choice is that Kant's work-and, perhaps even 
more significantly, the reception of Kant's work-has served to change in 
a significant way the context in whlch such questions need to be asked. 
We-at least those of us whose ambient intellectual culture has been that 
oflate Western modernity-are all "post-Kantians:' I use this term in the 
sense neither that we have simply left Kant behlnd such that his thought is 
now only a matter of "mere" historical interest, nor that we have realized 
that he is a carrier of an infectious conceptual syndrome for which we best 
seek a cure? I call us "post-Kantians" in the sense that Kant's work has 
played a role in determining how we may construe the very meaning of 
what it is to be human in our relation to one another, to the cosmos, and 
to the transcendent Other that Christian discourse names "God:' Kant's 
work and its reception has been, at least for those who have been carried 
about on the main intellectual currents of Western modernity, one of the 
forces that have set the trajectory of that current, even as it encounters the 
under-currents and counter-currents we have cometo call "post-moder-
nity" and, as these mingle, rush through seemingly uncharted rapids of 
global cultural, intellectual, and social change. 
Within such a context, any efforts to find a starting point for ecu-
menical conversation in a reading ofKant-as a thinker ofthe past who is 
worth engaging as we grapple with the insistent theological issues of today 
and tomorrow-needs to be carried on at multiple levels. The most basic 
level is constituted by Kant's own complex philosophlcal discourse. At this 
level, it is hardly surprising that Kant's interpreters disagree over many 
matters, including sorne that are as basic as understanding the aim and the 
finality ofhis great project of critique. My dissertation director, Alexander 
von Schoenborn, first drew my attention to what I have come to call "the 
many faces of Kant:' He knew that one large issue that led me to study 
philosophy was the seemingly unbridgeable chasm between the regnant 
Anglo-American "analytic" style of philosophy and the various styles of 
7· See, for instance, Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Is It Possible and Desirable for Theolo-
gians to Recover from Kant?" Modern 7heology 14 (1998) 1-18. 
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philosophy that, from the analytic perspective, were often casually lumped 
together as "continental:' In his efforts to persuade me to focus my dis-
sertation on Kant, one reason he offered-and the one I still recall most 
clearly-was that Kant is the last philosopher ofhistorical importance that 
everyone, analytic or continental, reads. The inference from this (which 
he let me draw for myself) was that, if I hoped to help build even a small 
footbridge across that philosophical chasm, sorne of the more effective 
tools and useful materials for doing so might come from Kant. It has since 
become clear tome that a similar dynamic is also at work in Kant's rela-
tion to theology: dealing with Kant, even if only by way of rejection, has 
been an unavoidable point of reference for most Protestant and Catholic 
theologies for more than two centuries 
In the course of efforts to articulate an understanding of Kant that 
might have a philosophically or theologically "ecumenical" import, an im-
portant lesson I have learned from Kant's own work is that it is crucial to 
attend to the orientation with which one approaches any conceptual ter-
rain, including Kant's own. Thus, in the case of the writings that explicitly 
constitute his project of critique, the scope, the trajectory, and the results 
of that enterprise take on a different configuration when approached from 
the works that constitute its end point than they do when approached 
from the works with which it was initiated.8 Similarly, ifwe align the cen-
tral trajectory ofhis critica! project along epistemological coordinates, by 
seeing that project as providing a mediating track between empiricism 
and rationalism, our reading of the overall import of the project and of 
the role played by its various parts will come out differently than if we 
align-as sorne recent Kant interpreters have argued that it is appropri-
ate to do-that central trajectory along moral and anthropological coor-
dinates, by conceiving his critical project as a track mediating primarily 
between skepticism and dogmatism. 
At least one crucial textual basis for orienting a reading ofKant's crit-
ica! enterprise along moral and anthropological coordinates is the well-
known passage from the first Critique in which he enumerates the three 
questions that articulate the defining "interests" of reason: "What can I 
know?" "What should I do?" and "What may I hope?"9 1hat text does not 
directly include the fourth question which Kant, in at least two other texts, 
8. In fact, I think a particularly useful touchstone for testing one's own point of 
orientation for reading Kant can be found in the questions "Did Kant complete his 
critica} enterprise, and, if so, in which one ofhis writings did he do so?" 
9· Critique ofPure Reason A8o4- 5/B 832- 33. 
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put forth as gathering together the other three: "What is humanity?"10 I 
believe a strong case can be made-as is done in the work of Susan Nei-
man-that these passages indicate that what Kant understands as the fun-
damental dynamic ofhuman reason, namely, a drive to render intelligible, 
to make sense of, what it is to be human, provides the fundamental thrust 
and trajectory to his critica! project. Of course, simply making a plausible 
case for a basic anthropological thrust to Kant's critica! project is hardly 
enough to render Kant philosophically, let alone theologically "ecumeni-
cal"; Kant's account of what it is to be human is by no means uncontro-
versial. But the way that Kant's work can be considered "ecumenical" is 
not that he provides an account of the human on which we can agree with 
little controversy. It is "ecumenical" in that it provides a focus that all of us 
can recognize as fundamental and unavoidable, a focus u pon which we all 
need to articulate our understanding if we hope to engage one another in 
productive conversation about important philosophical and theological 
differences. Kant's work is "ecumenical" in that it requires us to hold one 
another's "feet to the (conceptual) fire" with respect to our understanding 
of the human, with respect to what we take to be the best philosophical 
and theological account we can give of our humanity, its hopes and its 
destiny, as we stand in relation to one another, to the world, and to the 
transcendent divine. 
So, if it is correct to take the trajectory of Kant's work to be oriented 
by human reason's effort to render its very humanity intelligible, then 
the further suggestion I have made, namely, that it provides a locus for 
theological engagement requires both explication and justification. Those 
familiar with even the smallest part of the long-vexed controversies over 
faith and reason ( or grace and nature or revelation and reason) will realize 
that the kind of juxtaposition I am proposing walks directly into deeply 
disputed territory. One may appropriately ask, how can an anthropology 
such as Kant's, in which all seems to be measured by the capacity of hu-
man reason, claim to offer itself as a resource for theology, which has its 
origin in the initiative of the Other that exceeds reason? This challenge 
is as old as Tertullian's question, "What does Athens have to do with 
Jerusalem ?"11 In a range of current theological discussions, we can see 
this concern, for example, in the work of the proponents of various forms 
of "post-liberal theology" or "Radical Orthodoxy:· or in the dynamics of 
10. The fourth question is posed in the Lectures on Logic (Jaeske) andina letter to 
Carl Friedrich Staudlin, dated May 4, 1793. 
11. De praescriptione haereticorum, chapter 7· 
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controversy among Catholic theologians who would pit von Balthasar 
against Rahner or ressourcement over against aggiornamento. There are 
many dimensions of these controversies, but the one most germane for 
my purposes concerns the role of the "anthropological" with respect to 
the "theological": to what extent is it (theologically) proper and legitimate 
to claim that what we come to understand about our humanity provides 
us with a place from within which we may encounter and articulate truth 
about the divine Other, who is (definitively) revealed in Jesus the Christ? 
As an initial step in approaching this question and in rendering an answer 
that constructively engages Kant's thought, it may be useful to reconsider 
the standard epistemic reading of his critica! project, in which the "limits 
of reason" becorne the wedge for dislodging "faith" and to propose, in its 
stead, a reading in which recognition of the moral finitude of our human 
condition in our practical, that is, moral, use of reason provides the place 
from which we are empowered to act in hope. 
11. BEYOND "THE EPISTEMIC KANT" 
Once u pon a time we thought we knew the story of modern philosophy 
and how that philosophy played its role in shaping the culture of the West. 
It all started with Descartes, and it all had to do with epistemology; the 
key questions were about the possibility, the legitimation, and the scope of 
human knowledge. It was a story shaped by the interplay between empiri-
cists and rationalists, between whom Kant tried to shape a middle path. 
But it is also a story which subsequent philosophical controversy has not 
yet brought to conclusion; we have yet to come to a point in the story in 
which we might be able to say, "They lived happily ever after:' Yet there is 
a certain way in which this story has ended, even though no one seems to 
have told the philosophers. The story has ended through the emergence 
of a secular, technological culture, which has opted for the empirical, the 
testable, the marketable, and what works, as the measures of what we 
know and what is true. In the face of such apparent cultural hegemony, 
the philosophical telling of the story seems to have been rendered not so 
much untrue, but irrelevant. 
Philosophy itself had a role in making this story irrelevant, but that 
ironic complicity is not the main point of calling to mind how culture 
"on the ground" may have rendered moot the long history of philosophi-
cal battles over epistemology. E ven as academic philosophy ( especially 
in the English speaking world) continued to wrestle with the heritage of 
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Descartes' rooting of knowing in the indubitable certainty and clarity of 
what presents itself to reflective consciousness, there were voices within 
the philosophical world that were offering alternative accounts of the ca-
reer of modern philosophy (and, implicitly, about the career .of modern 
culture). Sorne of those voices proposed a return to the skepticism that 
brought about Descartes' efforts to secure certainty in knowing-and in 
that they resonate with the voice of David Hume, who is the precursor of 
a very important form of the postmodern. Others sought to circumvent 
the impasse by turning attention away from thought and consciousness 
to language as it is embedded in human activity and practice. Yet many of 
these voices did not fundamentally challenge the story that "it all began 
with Descartes:' There were exceptions: Nietzsche is surely one of them, 
to the extent that he took the story to be not about knowledge, but about 
power. In doing so he provides one of the markers along the way in which 
an important contemporary interpreter of Kant, Susan Neiman, has re-
counted the story of modern philosophy and Kant's role in it.12 
On Neiman's reading, the story of modern philosophy has not pri-
marily been about what can we know and how can we know it; it has been 
about the problem of evil. It has been about philosophy's efforts to ren-
der intelligible the difference between the world as it is, where things go 
terribly wrong, and the world as it ought to be, where things go as they 
should. This is the fundamental "fracture" that we encounter in the world, 
a fracture to which she sees Kant so attentive that she speaks of it as his 
"metaphysic of permanent rupture:'13 Neiman's rereading ofKant has a va-
riety of sources, for example, her keen awareness of the manner in which 
philosophy and culture interact. But a particularly important source ofher 
reinterpretation of Kant she shares with a number of other Kant scholars 
who have also be en "rereading Kant" ( the subtitle of her first book, The 
Unity ofReason). They are looking at this project from two opposite direc-
tions, not just from the perspective of its extensive initial articulation in 
the 1st Critique (which is the way it is looked at in the standard story), but 
also from the perspective provided by the 2nd and 3rd Critiques, as well 
as by many of the writings Kant produced in the 1790s in which he con-
tinued to struggle to bring his critical project to its completion. Looking 
at Kant's critica! project from the former perspective makes plausible "the 
epistemic Kant" of the standard story, a Kant who is primarily interested 
12. 7he Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); 
Evil in Modern 1hought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002). 
13. Evil in Modern 1hought, So. 
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in dealing with the aftermath of Descartes' rooting of knowledge in self-
consciousness. Looking at Kant's project from the latter perspective-one 
that takes into account writings such as Religion within the Bounds of Mere 
Reason, Perpetua[ Peace, The Metaphysics of Morals, and The Strife of the 
Faculties-we see him grappling with an issue in which the epistemic is 
just a part. This issue concerns the human place in the cosmos; it focuses 
upon trying to render intelligible our human status as the unique juncture 
of freedom and nature. 
For Kant, moreover, rendering intelligible our human status ofbeing 
this unique junction of nature and freedom is not merely a matter of theo-
retical concern; it is a matter of urgent practica! interest, for on it he sees 
hanging the possibilities that human beings have for taking responsibility 
for participating in the shaping of their own destiny as a species. It should 
be emphasized, moreover, that Kant does not think that our destiny is 
totally in our hands. As Neiman strikingly puts it, "[o]f the many dis-
tinctions Kant took wisdom and sanity to depend on drawing, none was 
deeper than the difference between God and the rest of us. Kant reminds 
usas often as possible of all that God can do and all we cannot. Nobody in 
the history of philosophy was more aware of the number of ways we can 
forget it:'14 Kant is neither Nietzschean nor Promethian, but he does affirm 
that for our destiny to be truly ours as human we must have a genuine 
hand in its making, even if it also depends at least as fundamentally u pon 
the workings of what he variously calls "nature" or "providence:' 
At the heart of Kant's account, on Neiman's reading of it, is what she 
calls "dissonance and conflict at the heart of experience"15 that renders 
problematic human reason's effort to resol ve it. The world "as it is" presents 
itself to the theoretical use of reason as the "appearance" of a nature that, in 
its causal dynamism, works at best indifferently to the ends and purposes 
that the practica! use of reason proposes as befitting the dignity of our 
finite human freedom. Neiman notes, "It would be easy to acknowledge 
that not controlling the natural world is part of being human, were it not 
for the fact that things go wrong. The thought that the rift between freedom 
and nature is neither error nor punishment, but the fault line along which 
the universe is structured can be a so urce of perfect terror:' 16 
So as mightily as Kant labors in the Critique of the Power of fudg-
ment, as well as in his occasional essays on history, politics and culture, 
14. Ibid., 75· 
15. lbid., So. 
16. Ibid., So-81. 
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to legitimate the application of categories of purpose to the workings of 
nature, that legitimation is not put forth as the basis for a claim about how 
the world "is:' Whatever purposes, if any, the world of nature may have 
"as it is" "in-itself" remain opaque in principie to the theoretical use of 
finite human reason. Even more important for Kant is the fact that what-
ever moral purposes we may think are necessary for our making sense 
of the world are not features of the world but rather a demand that our 
reason brings to the world. Bringing to the world "as it is" the demand of 
practica! reason to fashion the world "as it ought to be" is central to what 
Kant affirms as the primacy of the practica! use of reason. The exercise of 
our finite reason brings those purposes to the world not in the mode of 
theoretical knowledge but in the mode of a practica!, enacted hope that, by 
heeding the dictate of practica! reason to do as we ought, we make it pos-
sible for the world to have, in a least sorne small measure, a moral order of 
which it would otherwise seem devoid. 
Kant used a various pairs of coordinate terms to characterize this 
basic duality of our human experience, the two basic ways in which we 
engage the world. The distinctions between such paired terms, perhaps 
most famously and problematically that between "phenomenon" and 
"noumenon:· have vexed generations of sympathetic and hostile commen-
tators alike. It has rarely been the case, however, that the question of radical 
evil that Kant articulates in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 
has been pressed into service as a key interpretive guide to the contours 
of the fissure that he sees running through our human engagement with 
the world. That discussion of the moral structure of evil seems to offer 
little promise for interpretive purchase upon distinctions fundamental to 
the critica! project so long as Kant's affirmation of a duality of nature and 
freedom is understood- as it has often been-as a response to epistemic 
and metaphysical issues that are taken to stand in isolation from moral 
and anthropological ones. In consequence, his explicit engagement of the 
question ofhuman evil in the later phases ofthe critica! enterprise, as well 
as the maturation of his thought about the "highest good" as the social 
object of the practica! use of reason, has often been considered marginal 
to the main conceptual and argumentative strands of his monumental 
endeavor to delimit the scope ofhuman reason's engagement with the cos-
mos of which it is a part, in which it functions, and beyond which it drives 
itself to aspire. Similarly, as long as the vantage point from which Kant's 
writings are read remains epistemic, his various accounts of the "highest 
good" can also be seen as mere appendages to his efforts to vindicate the 
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theoretical use of reason. Once the focus shifts, however, to the vindica-
tion of reason's practica! (moral) use, which Kant called, in the Preface to 
Critique of Practica[ Reason, "the keystone"17 of the critica! enterprise, the 
role of "the highest good" becomes far more important, inasmuch as it is 
the object of the practica! use of reason, which has primacy both individu-
ally and socially. 
111. TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL GRAMMAR OF 
GRACE AND HOPE 
I hope that the discussion so far has provided sorne coordinates for un-
derstanding the way Kant sees our human condition in terms of a "meta-
physic of permanent rupture:' Let me now briefly sketch how, in response 
to these fractured human circumstances, Kant also provides the basis for 
constructing what may be termed "a grammar ofhope" oran "anthropol-
ogy of hope;' in connection with what we are called u pon to do with and 
for each other in the face of a fragmentation that presents itself to us in a 
variety of modes. This proposal is one that deliberately crosses back and 
forth between philosophical and theological modes of discourse and in 
which a key point of juncture is signaled by the space it then provides for 
using a grammar of "grace:' 
This proposal focuses on possibilities for engaging what I term 
Kant's "anthropological grammar of hope" so as to articulate that hope as 
a discourse of "grace:' In particular, I propose that Kant's understanding 
of hope, which arises from his account of the fragility of our human free-
doro, offers a basis for an anthropology that renders us receptive to wel-
coming that which comes in and through the fractured dynamics of our 
human circumstances as an invitation to encounter the work of "grace:' 18 
Kant situates our human freedom in the contingency of the cosmos; his 
account manifests a deep sense that the common fragility of our finite 
human freedom stands inextricably coordinate to the dignity that we must 
recognize in one another's humanity in the moral community he terms 
the "ethical commonwealth:' A relationality that is deeply embedded in 
17. Practica/ Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor, The Cambridge Edition of 
the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 139; 
German text: Kants Gesammelte Schriften, 5:3-4. 
18. For a more extensive discussion, see Philip J. Rossi, "Finite Freedom, Fractured 
and Fragile: Kant's Anthropology as Resource for a Postmodern Theology of Grace," in 
Philosophie et théologie: Festschrift Emilio Brito, SJ, ed. Bric Gaziaux (Leuven: Peeters, 
2007) 47-60. 
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our common human fragility is thus a key element for constructing an 
anthropology that inscribes human freedom in the embodied conditions 
of spatio-temporal finitude. Insofar as we each stand alone, our finitude 
provides thin and tenuous protection to our core dignity of spirit; under 
these conditions, our human power for bringing about good, rooted in 
the fragmentary, fragile exercise of a finite practica! reason, stands on a 
slender and precarious footing. Human fragility stands in need of what it 
cannot provide of itself; yet, if it is to act responsibly, it must m ove forward 
in the hope that what is needed to overcome fracture will be offered. In 
this respect, both "hope" and "grace" may be construed as openness to the 
empowering presence of otherness. 
One of the ways in which Kant suggests such an anticipatory move-
ment in the direction of awaiting grace is, I would argue, is the mutuality 
and social character of his characterization of autonomy. This, of course, 
should be surprising-even outrageous-to those schooled in under-
standing Kantian autonomy as a lonely and noble moral individual hero-
ism. I would argue, however, that a more accurate reading of autonomy 
in Kant is one in which awareness of the reciproca! connection of freely 
offered respect within which one stands to all other human agents-in 
Kant's terms, awareness of one's membership in a "kingdom of ends"-
brings with it a deep sense of the fragility of our finite human freedom, 
a fragility that goes along with the dignity that we accord to one another 
through our mutual respect. This fragility of human freedom is inscribed 
in the embodied conditions of our spatio-temporal finitude. Insofar as 
we each stand alone, our finitude provides thin and tenuous protection 
to our core dignity of spirit. The human power for bringing about good 
thoroughly pertains to, and is rooted in, the fragmentary, fragile exercise 
of a finite practica! reason. The ultimate bulwark for our finitude is not 
so much the solitary resoluteness that Iris Murdoch once so eloquently 
described in her depiction of Kantian autonomy19 as it is the mutual rec-
ognition and respect we accord each other for the fragile and vulnerable 
freedom we each embody. Kant's recognition of the inestimable dignity of 
the power of human freedom to effect good is equally a recognition that 
such power resides in agents who are themselves profoundly fragile, who 
exercise that power in a correspondingly fragile way, yet who are capable 
of empowering each other's freedom in mutual respect for one another's 
19. "Kant's [autonomous] man had already received a glorious incarnation nearly 
a century earlier in the work of Mil ton: His proper name is Lucifer." The Sovereignty 
of Good, Studies in Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion (1970; repr., New York: 
Schocken, 1971) So. 
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fragility. As embodied, moreover, our freedom is rendered fragile not sim-
ply by the inconstancy of intention that Kant marks out as the "inversion 
of our maxims;' nor only by the inattention and distraction with which 
we thoughtlessly descend into evil's banality. Our embodied freedom is 
also made fragile by a vulnerability ofboth body and spirit to violence and 
violation. 
The anthropology that 1 am suggesting can be drawn from Kant's 
account of finite freedom is thus one in which moral agency is exercised 
from a locus of human vulnerability and human solidarity that takes full 
account of the social and relational dynamisms that are central to Kant's 
understanding of finite human reason.20 This fact has important anthro-
pological implications. Once we take full account of those social and rela-
tional dynamisms, Kantian autonomy can be understood to have its most 
significant exercise in the context of a clear recognition of the fragility 
and vulnerability that form the matrix in which human finite reason finds 
that it must function. The mutual recognition ofhuman vulnerability thus 
constitutes a centrallocus for the dynamisms of hope and of grace. 
1 believe a case can be made that coordinate to this social anthropol-
ogy of finite reason is a grammar of moral hope that provides the structure 
for a syntax of moral recognition, a syntax that places constraint upon 
both explicit and implicit claims of self-preference, which constitutes the 
core of what Kant means by "radical evil:' Such syntax can be found in the 
"universallaw" formulation of the categorical imperative, which places a 
veto on the self-preferential obduracy of individual moral agents.21 It is 
also operative in the discourse of mutual respect appropriate to member-
ship and shared responsibility in what Kant terms "a kingdom of ends:' 
In this context, a syntax of moral recognition functions to clear a social 
space within which agents address not only questions of individual human 
interaction but also those dealing with the social governance of human 
life.22 On Kant's account, a grammar ofhope functions to break the grip of 
20. Por an extensive discussion, see Philip J. Rossi, SJ, The Social Authority of 
Reason: Kant's Critique, Radical Evn and the Destiny of Humankind, SUNY Series in 
Philosophy (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 2005). 
21. Placing this formulation in the context of the self-preferential obduracy of 
radical evil suggests that its focus is more on the veto it imposes on self-preference and 
self-exemption as stratagems that issue from "the dear self" than on a formal claim of 
"universalizabUity" that generations of Kant's critics have castigated as a moral version 
of "one size fits all." 
22. John Rawls' device in A Theory of ]ustice of"the original position" in which {ide-
al) agents deliberate about the terms of their social governance captures an important 
dimension of the social space that is a function of a syntax of mutual recognition. 
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self-preferential obduracy with respect both to the morallife of individual 
agents and to the structure and dynamics by which human agents mutu-
ally govern their social, political, and cultural interaction. 
As a result, within the larger social framework that human autonomy 
provides, the fragility of human freedom stands coordinate to its dignity. 
As we each stand alone, our embodied state provides thin and tenuous 
protection to our core dignity of spirit. As I have mentioned already, the 
ultimate bulwark of that dignity is the mutual recognition and respect 
we accord each other for the fragile and vulnerable freedom we each em-
body. I noted above that Kant's recognition of the inestimable dignity of 
the power of human freedom to effect good is equally a recognition that 
such power resides in agents who are themselves profoundly fragile, who 
exercise that power in a correspondingly fragile way, yet who are capable 
of empowering each other's freedom in mutual respect for one another's 
fragility. In Kant's account, moreover, the finitude of the human freedom 
that is exercised in the community of mutual respect that he calls "the 
ethical commonwealth" has moral intelligibility in virtue of its standing in 
relation to adivine transcendence that affirms human moral responsibility 
in the shaping ofhistory.23 
In providing the moral space for human finite agency to have a genu-
inely constitutive role-though not the sale one-in shaping the trajectory 
and outcome of human destiny, di vine transcendence thus opens a locus 
for the work of grace. In this case, grace functions in the moral space of 
mutual respect for freedom. A divine respect for human freedom holds 
humanity morally accountable, and a human respect for divine freedom 
acknowledges that human finitude cannot comprehend the mode of that 
divine freedom's enactment, save in terms of its steadfast respect for the 
exercise of human free do m, a respect to which I think it would be apt to 
apply Charles Taylor's characterization of a principie at the heart of the 
transformative activity of God: "God's steadfast resolve not to abandon 
humanity in its worst distress:'24 
23. See Philip J. Rossi, "Faith, Autonomy, and the Limits of Agency in a Secular 
Age;' in At the Limits of the Secular: Catholic Reflections on Faith and Public Life, ed. 
William Barbieri (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, forthcoming). 
24. A Secular Age, 654. 
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